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Non-technical summary
Many studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) fiscal policies concentrate on
the relations between jurisdictions within a single region. These works usually disregard
possible extra-regional effects. In this paper we evaluate the validity of such restriction
by focussing on local tax competition. With respect to local corporate tax competition,
the intensity of competition for mobile capital between jurisdictions should determine
their intensity of strategic interactions in business tax policy. However, as the underlying
reality (i.e., competitive forces) is hard to measure objectively, politicians’ beliefs about
what is real are especially likely to become of crucial importance. For this purpose, we
study German local politicians’ assessments of their jurisdictions’ main competitors in
the struggle to attract firms.
Our empirical results are based on both OLS and natural spline regressions using survey
data from over 700 German municipal leaders in the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. They
show that most politicians perceive other municipalities within their own state as the
strongest competitive force. Yet, a crucial caveat to this finding concerns municipalities
‘near’ a border, in which politicians also perceive a strong competitive threat from across
the border. This corroborates the idea that municipalities near a border have a broader
reference group than is commonly assumed in the existing literature. Moreover, the im-
portance of borders as a dividing line varies depending on the type of border. First, ceteris
paribus, their effect is weaker (i.e., less constraining) for national than international bor-
ders: this means decision-makers in municipalities up to roughly 20km from the border
take competition with jurisdictions beyond the border into consideration when a national,
inter-regional border, is concerned, while the equivalent effect of an international border
ceases after approximately 12.5km. Second, in our sample the French-German border is
shown to have a stronger effect than the Swiss-German border. One tentative explana-
tion is that politicians perceive the cultural dimension of these respective borders (i.e.,
language) to be more important than the institutional dimension (EU versus non-EU).
Alternatively, it could reflect Switzerland’s more aggressive corporate tax policy. Over-
all, our findings suggest that geographically close municipalities perceive each other as
competitors for mobile capital regardless of the state or country where they are located.
This indicates a need to refine the commonly used contiguity- and distance-based neigh-
bourhood matrices by treating border-municipalities differently from in-land ones to avoid
biased estimations of spatial interactions.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Zahlreiche Untersuchungen zu ra¨umlichen Interaktionen von politischen Entscheidungen
in der (kommunalen) Fiskalpolitik konzentrieren sich auf die Beziehungen zwischen Ge-
bietsko¨rperschaften in einer (einzigen) Region. Diese Arbeiten ignorieren gewo¨hnlich
mo¨gliche Interaktionen, die u¨ber die Regionengrenzen hinausreichen. In diesem Pa-
pier untersuchen wir die Gu¨ltigkeit einer solchen Einschra¨nkung, wobei wir uns auf den
kommunalen Steuerwettbewerb fokussieren. Im kommunalen Unternehmenssteuerwett-
bewerb sollte die Intensita¨t des Wettbewerbs um mobiles Kapital zwischen den Gebiets-
ko¨rperschaften das Ausmaß ihrer strategischen Interaktionen in der Steuersetzung de-
terminieren. Jedoch ist die zu Grunde liegende Wettbewerbsintensita¨t kaum objektiv
messbar, so dass der Einscha¨tzung der Politiker u¨ber diese Realita¨t eine entscheidende
Rolle zukommt. Zu diesem Zweck analysieren wir die Einscha¨tzungen von deutschen
Lokalpolitikern hinsichtlich ihrer Hauptwettbewerber im Standortwettbewerb.
Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse basieren auf OLS- und Natural Spline-Regressionen, in
denen Umfragedaten von u¨ber 700 baden-wu¨rttembergischen Bu¨rgermeistern verwendet
wurden. Diese zeigen, dass die meisten Politiker andere Sta¨dte und Gemeinden innerhalb
ihres Bundeslandes als ihre Hauptwettbewerber ansehen. Jedoch gilt dieser Befund nur
eingeschra¨nkt fu¨r diejenigen Gemeinden, die in der “Na¨he” einer Grenze liegen; in diesen
nehmen die Politiker auch einen starken Wettbewerbsdruck von jenseits der Grenze war.
Dieses spiegelt die Einscha¨tzung wider, dass Jurisdiktionen in der Na¨he einer Grenze eine
breitere Referenzgruppe aufweisen als gewo¨hnlich in der Literatur angenommen wird. Zu-
dem unterscheidet sich die Bedeutung von Grenzen als Trennungslinie in Abha¨ngigkeit von
der Art der Grenze. Erstens ist ihr Effekt, ceteris paribus, schwa¨cher (d.h. weniger ein-
schra¨nkend) fu¨r innerstaatliche im Vergleich zu internationalen Grenzen: Die Ergebnisse
besagen, dass im Falle von innerstaatlichen Grenzen die Entscheidungstra¨ger bis zu einer
Grenzentfernung von etwa 20 km die Jurisdiktionen jenseits der Grenze beru¨cksichtigen.
Der a¨quivalente Effekt bei einer internationalen Grenze erlischt jedoch bereits nach etwa
12,5 km. Zweitens zeigt sich in unserem Datensatz, dass die franzo¨sisch-deutsche Grenze
einen sta¨rkeren Effekt als die schweizerisch-deutsche Grenze ausu¨bt. Eine vorsichtige
Erkla¨rung dafu¨r ist, dass Politiker die kulturelle (d.h., die sprachliche) Dimension der je-
weiligen Grenze als wichtiger erachten als die institutionelle Dimension (EU vs. nicht-EU).
Alternativ ko¨nnte dies aber auch die aggressivere Unternehmenssteuerpolitik der Schweiz
widerspiegeln. Insgesamt deuten unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass sich geografisch nahe
liegende Jurisdiktionen als Wettbewerber um mobiles Kapital ansehen, ungeachtet des
Bundeslandes oder Staates in dem sie gelegen sind. Daraus ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit,
die gewo¨hnlich verwendeten nachbarschafts- und distanzbasierten Entfernungsmatrizen
zu pra¨zisieren, indem Grenzgemeinden anders als im Landesinneren gelegene Gemeinden
behandelt werden, um so verzerrte Scha¨tzungen der ra¨umlichen Interaktionen zu vermei-
den.
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1 Introduction
Whether at the national or local level, a government deciding public policies in one juris-
diction is likely to affect – and be affected by – decisions of governments in other juris-
dictions (e.g., due to spillover effects or strategic decision-making). The resulting spatial
policy interdependence has received significant attention from regional science scholars,
urban and public economists and political scientists in recent years, both in terms of
its measurement and its implications (for partial reviews, see Brueckner, 2003; Revelli,
2005). A central concern for empirical analyses of such spatial policy interactions relates
to the specification of the neighbourhood matrix. As the components of this matrix –
i.e., so-called ‘spatial weights’, which define who is expected to compete with whom –
cannot be directly estimated from the data (due to a lack of degrees of freedom; e.g.,
Case et al., 1993), their specification is at the discretion of the researcher and critically
depends on the underlying theoretical model (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). In this
paper, we focus on the competition of public authorities to attract mobile capital, so
that the spatial weights should ideally reflect the mobility of capital between these ju-
risdictions (Brueckner (2003)). However, most previous work either relies on a simple
contiguity- or distance-based neighbourhood-specification, or augments the latter with
socio-demographic criteria such as relative population size. Additionally, and crucially,
the spatial weights are generally defined with reference to only a limited group of coun-
tries in the literature on international competition (e.g., Devereux et al. 2008) or with
reference to other jurisdictions within one single region which is analysed when studying
local competition (which is the focus of this paper).1
Although the latter operational choice is often due to the lack of comparable data
from outside the analysed region, it disregards any possible extra-regional effects, and
implicitly assumes that competitive forces are independent of the distance to surrounding
regions. While one could conceive of arguments to justify such assumptions2, their validity
1Prominent examples in the local tax competition literature include, among several others, Brueckner
and Saavedra (2001) on cities in the Boston metropolitan area, Brett and Pinkse (2000) on municipalities
in the Canadian province of British Columbia, and Buettner (2003) on jurisdictions in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg.
2Depending on the underlying theoretical model, several partial defences can be provided. First, from
a tax competition perspective, mobile factors, such as capital or workers, may face a significant hurdle to
move across a border. Second, from a yardstick competition perspective, firms and/or citizens may not
believe that jurisdictions at the opposite side of an (inter)national border are a relevant ‘yardstick’ for
their own incumbents’ policies or they may be less likely to obtain and/or process information from ‘the
other side’. In both cases, the result is that politicians’ need to mimic cross-border jurisdictions’ policies
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has, to the best of our knowledge, not been subject to direct empirical scrutiny. Indirect
evidence does exist, but it remains inconclusive. On the one hand, Gérard et al. (2010)
fail to find significant interactions in the tax-setting of municipalities located in different
Belgian regions. Sub-national borders in Belgium, however, are likely to constitute a
significant barrier to firm mobility due to the predominant role of the regions in Belgian
federalism as well as their concurrence with linguistic borders. On the other hand, Brügger
and Parchet (2010) demonstrate that although linguistic borders in Switzerland weaken
policy interdependence, fiscal interactions persist also between municipalities belonging to
different regions. This suggests that jurisdictions’ peer group need not consist exclusively
of jurisdictions within their own region.
This paper takes a first step to assess this issue more directly by addressing two related
questions. First, do jurisdictions near a border compete only with jurisdictions on their
own side of the border (as implicitly assumed in most previous work), or do they have a
broader reference group? This question regards what could be designated as a pure border
effect ; it evaluates the constraining strength of borders. Such border effects are well-known
in the trade literature, and we will study whether they also matter in fiscal competition.
Second, how far ‘inland’ do competitive pressures from beyond the borders reach? This
question pertains to the radius within which the neighbourhood to another region is
taken into account by local decision-makers (a proximity effect). The answers to both
questions have important implications for the specification of contiguity- and distance-
based neighbourhood matrices in future work, even for studies concerned with a single
well-defined region. Specifically, when border-jurisdictions perceive themselves as having
an inter-regional reference group (i.e., question 1), they should be treated differently from
inland-jurisdictions in the analysis. The revelation that such effects either materialise
only in close proximity to the border or persist also at significant distances (i.e., question
2) indicates how broadly such re-operationalisation should be applied (or, more negatively,
how strong the bias in current approaches is likely to be).
We tackle both questions by surveying politicians about their perceptions of their
jurisdictions’ most important competitors.3 While politicians’ opinions have until now
is weakened, though it obviously need not disappear completely.
3Alternatively, we could set up a spatial econometric model with separate spatial weights matrices
for jurisdictions far from or near a border and re-estimate it under varying operationalisations of what
defines being ‘near’ a border. As detailed in the main text, we think our use of politicians’ opinions
has distinct benefits for addressing our research questions and is less cumbersome in its approach to the
proximity effect.
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not been explicitly exploited to define jurisdictions’ peer groups, the processes analysed
in the literature (i.e., intergovernmental interactions) are real-world phenomena whereby
politicians take behaviour elsewhere into account. As the underlying competitive forces
are hard to measure objectively, politicians’ beliefs about what is real are especially likely
to become of crucial importance. In line with this idea, Revelli and Tovmo (2007) il-
lustrate that spatial policy dependence is particularly strong between jurisdictions where
politicians believe that voters engage in benchmarking of their performance against other
jurisdictions (for a related finding, see Brülhart and Parchet, 2010). This suggests that
politicians’ opinions about the importance of competitive pressures and the extent of tax
base mobility have important implications for their policy decisions. As demonstrated by
Heinemann and Janeba (forthcoming), the opinions of politicians can exhibit consider-
able variation also within the same institutional environment. This justifies the approach
taken in the present analysis.
Our empirical results are based on both OLS and natural spline regressions using sur-
vey data from over 700 German municipal leaders in the state of Baden-Württemberg.
This state is located in the south-west of Germany; it is surrounded by three German
states to the north and east, as well as France to the west and Switzerland to the south.
The results show that most politicians perceive other municipalities within their own state
as the strongest competitive force. Yet, a crucial caveat to this finding concerns munic-
ipalities ‘near’ a border, in which politicians also perceive a strong competitive threat
from across the border. This corroborates the idea that municipalities near a border have
a broader reference group than is commonly assumed in the existing literature. More-
over, the importance of borders as a dividing line varies depending on the type of border.
First, ceteris paribus, their effect is weaker (i.e., less constraining) for national than in-
ternational borders: this means decision-makers in municipalities up to roughly 20km
from the border (or about 10% of the maximum possible distance to such a border in our
sample) take competition with jurisdictions beyond the border into consideration when
a national, inter-regional border, is concerned, while the equivalent effect of an interna-
tional border ceases after approximately 12.5km (or about 6% of the maximum possible
distance). Although these distances appear relatively small, the effect is substantive, as
it comprises 21% and 9.5% of all municipalities in the state, respectively. Second, in our
sample the French-German border is shown to have a stronger dividing effect than the
Swiss-German border. One tentative explanation is that politicians perceive the cultural
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dimension of these respective borders (i.e., language) to be more important than the insti-
tutional dimension (EU versus non-EU). Alternatively, it could reflect Switzerland’s more
aggressive corporate tax policy. Overall, our findings suggest that geographically close
municipalities perceive each other as competitors for mobile capital regardless of the state
or country where they are located. This indicates a need to refine the commonly used
contiguity- and distance-based neighbourhood matrices by treating border-municipalities
differently from in-land ones to avoid biased inferences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 critically reviews the
types of spatial weights matrices commonly employed in the literature and derives testable
hypotheses concerning the effect of (inter)national borders. Section 3 discusses our survey
design and the empirical methodology employed to verify the existence and persistence of
border-effects. The results are described in section 4, while section 5 contains a concluding
discussion.
2 Defining the neighbourhood
2.1 A critical view of existing approaches
Independent of the underlying theoretical framework, operationalisations of a jurisdic-
tion’s ‘neighbourhood’ in studies of spatial policy interdependence most often rely on a
simple contiguity- or distance-based criterion. Neighbours are thereby defined as two ju-
risdictions which share a border (e.g., Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Geys, 2006; Rincke,
2007) or are within a certain Euclidian or travel distance from each other (e.g., Büttner,
2001, 2003; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007; Brett and Tardiff, 2008). In a similar vein, the
inverse of the distance between jurisdictions is often invoked to approximate the strength
of the assumed competitive relation between them (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001;
Charlot and Paty, 2007; Koh and Riedel, 2010). Such distance-based criteria can be
justified by the fact that proximity is important for the dissemination of information –
certainly at the local government level (Allers and Elhorst, 2005) – and is significantly
linked to relocation decisions, both for individuals (e.g., Day, 1992) and firms (e.g., van
Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000).4
4In order to define peers more specifically, some scholars move beyond a merely geographical neigh-
bourhood criterion by including information on, for example, relative population sizes, migration patterns
4
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, the delineation of jurisdictions’ peer groups
in most studies relies exclusively on ‘objective’ data and never accounts for politicians’
perceptions about who they believe to be competing with. Such beliefs, however, are likely
to play a critical role. Revelli and Tovmo (2007), for example, indicate that the spatial
parameter estimated for local government efficiency patterns in Norway is significantly
larger for jurisdictions whose politicians believe that voters employ other jurisdictions’
performance as a yardstick, suggesting the importance of politicians’ perceptions for ob-
served policy interactions.
More generally, politicians’ beliefs are likely to matter for their decisions independent
of whether they are correct (i.e., accurately reflecting reality) or biased. On the one hand,
if one assumes that rational politicians have unbiased beliefs, their observable decisions
will reflect the underlying reality. Even then, however, politicians’ subjective opinions will
continue to play a crucial role in settings where the underlying reality is hard to measure
objectively (such as, for example, concerning inter-jurisdictional competitive forces). In
such a setting, objective data are arguably ‘unavailable’, and subjective perceptions –
which in this case are assumed unbiased – become central to the decision-making process.
On the other hand, if one allows for biased beliefs, the actual truth (e.g., mobility of
firms) might become less relevant than politicians’ perceptions thereof, since it is these
perceptions that shape their decisions. This idea rests on a substantial academic literature
indicating that individuals’ actions in a wide variety of situations are more often driven by
subjective perceptions rather than objective facts.5 Politicians are unlikely to be immune
to such effects. Evidence in this direction is provided by Brülhart and Parchet (2010) who
find that Swiss municipalities strategically interact in their inheritance tax decisions in
the belief that tax competition takes place. However, the authors do not find any tax base
effects induced by tax differentials. Hence, politicians apparently base their decisions on
wrong assumptions about the mobility of the taxable object (referred to as “alleged tax
between jurisdictions (e.g., Case et al., 1993; Baicker, 2005; Rincke, 2010) or, in studies of international tax
competition, the level of trade integration between countries (e.g., Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Exbrayat,
2009).
5Voter turnout in elections and participation in rebellious collective action, for example, have been
linked to the individuals’ overestimation of their personal influence on such actions’ outcomes (e.g., Muller
and Opp, 1986; Opp, 2001). Similarly, “subjective interpretations of recurrence risks are better predictors
of reproductive intentions [of people with genetic disorders] than the ‘objective’ risks” (e.g., Shiloh and
Saxe, 1989, 45). With respect to US tax policy, Birney et al. (2006), Krupnikov et al. (2006), Slemrod
(2006) and Sides (2010) analyse the critical role of voter misconceptions and ignorance in explaining
voters’ views on, for example, the repeal of estate taxation and the replacement of income taxes by flat
or retail sales taxes.
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competition” by Brülhart and Parchet, 2010, 1).
It is then only a small step to exploit politicians’ subjective perceptions about the
identity of their most important competitors in order to construct the neighbourhood
matrix, rather than their view on the mere existence of such competitors (as studied in,
e.g., Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997, 2000; Hendrick et al., 2007; Heinemann and Janeba,
forthcoming).
Moreover, applying contiguity- or distance-based specifications of the neighbourhood
matrix only within one analysed region, as most studies do, implicitly assumes that the
world ends at the region’s border. This clearly does not need to be the case, as Brügger
and Parchet (2010) demonstrate for culturally defined regions in Switzerland. They find
that local income tax burdens in Swiss municipalities do not change discreetly at the
language border dividing the regions, but exhibit smooth spatial gradients. Although
‘cross-border’ interactions are found to be weaker than ‘within-region’ interactions, the
mere presence of such interregional interdependence indicates that municipalities along a
(language) border are not only competing with neighbours in their own region. Indeed, it
demonstrates that decision-making processes in at least some jurisdictions are influenced
by what happens beyond a border.6
2.2 Hypotheses on the effect of (proximity to) borders
In what follows, we take up both criticisms simultaneously by empirically evaluating
whether the inclusion of politicians’ opinions (criticism 1) can help to disclose the limi-
tations of uni-regional analyses (criticism 2). The central idea is that decision-makers in
jurisdictions near a border may well perceive themselves to have a different peer group
than the one consisting only of jurisdictions within the own region. This allows for poten-
tial cross-border interactions because in such setting borders are not always perceived by
politicians to be insurmountable obstacles for, for example, mobile capital. Moreover, one
could argue that such effects need not be constrained to jurisdictions located physically
at the border (e.g., effects of cross-border trade often persist at considerable distances
from the border; see Asplund et al., 2007; Beatty et al., 2009). Such a proposition in-
deed follows naturally from the commonly acknowledged central importance of distance
6The same inference can obviously be drawn from the vast literature on cross-border shopping (for
reviews, see Chiou and Muehlegger, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008).
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(see above); however, while the existing literature has consistently assumed that distance
is crucial within a given region, the same logic can easily be transferred to jurisdictions
outside that region. Doing so implies that proximity to jurisdictions outside the analysed
region (i.e., on the other side of the border) defines the extent to which local decision-
makers perceive the intensity of competition with these jurisdictions (relative to those
within the own state). This leads to a first testable hypothesis:
H1: Proximity to competing jurisdictions beyond subnational or international borders
shifts politicians’ perceptions on the relative importance of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ com-
petitors: they perceive a stronger competitive pressure from ‘external’ competitors; a
proximity effect.
Clearly, however, the mere existence of borders is likely to retain at least some ‘closing-off’
effect. Indeed, although Basile et al. (2009) demonstrate that location choices for multi-
nationals in Europe are becoming increasingly uncoupled from national borders due to
increased integration, significant evidence indicates that borders continue to impede trade
(e.g., McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), even in highly integrated areas
such as NAFTA and the European Union (EU). Some authors explain this persistence by
the existence of technical barriers (e.g., Chen, 2004), while others suggest that cultural
factors may drive these results (e.g., Guiso et al., 2009).
While this suggests a perceptible effect of international borders, a similar effect could
also be expected from subnational borders in a federal state, such as Germany. In our
German setting, the effect might be driven by cultural factors since state borders in Ger-
many largely coincide with historical and/or cultural borders, and the latter have been
shown to still matter for economic decisions such as migration (e.g., Falck et al., 2010). It
may also be caused by institutional factors as firms need to register at chambers of com-
merce (IHK), whose authority coincides with state borders. Furthermore, employment
conditions (including wages) are often defined in so-called “master contracts” arranged at
the state level. Such administrative requirements increase the cost of firm mobility across
state borders. Finally, German municipalities are geographically arranged in districts
(Landkreis) and represented in state-level organisations (Gemeindetag), both of which
have an advisory and coordination function and lead to information exchange. Moreover,
their statistical and accounting systems are coordinated at the state level. As a result,
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local decision-makers are likely to be much better informed about the policies of munic-
ipalities in the same state, thus becoming more likely to focus on municipalities in the
same state as their reference group. Moreover, Turrini and van Ypersele (2010) identify
asymmetries in judicial systems as driving forces of the border effect in trade, both at the
national level (due to international differences in the judicial system) and the subnational
level (due to the competency of different courts of appeal, which is also a relevant dividing
line between German states).
Taken together, state borders are likely to have a relatively weaker ‘closing-off’ effect
than national borders since mobility as well as information costs are arguably lower across
the former. This discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Both national and international borders are perceived as real barriers; a border effect.
International borders are likely to exert a stronger influence than national ones.
Given the institutional setting analysed below (i.e., municipalities in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg), the latter hypothesis can be specified a bit further. As Baden-
Württemberg shares a direct border with both France and Switzerland, this provides the
possibility to test for diverging effects of different types of international borders. On
the one hand, the border with France has a much stronger cultural dimension than the
one with Switzerland as Swiss municipalities near the Swiss-German border are German-
speaking. On the other hand, France is a member of the EU, while Switzerland is not
(although many of the economic freedoms provided by the EU apply to transactions with
Switzerland) and has its own currency. Hence, there might be a larger institutional hurdle
for firms to move from Germany to Switzerland than from Germany to France as they
effectively leave the EU-area in the former case. Analysing how politicians’ perceptions of
their jurisdictions’ main competitors varies along the French and Swiss borders provides
an opportunity to gain some (preliminary) insight into the relative importance of these
two effects. This is reflected in our third and final proposition:
H3: The effect of international borders varies with the cultural and institutional di-
mensions of such borders. The exact nature (and strength) of such mediating effects is
theoretically open and thus constitutes an empirical question.
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3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
We surveyed local decision-makers in the German state of Baden-Württemberg regarding
their perceptions of the competitive pressures between various jurisdictions to empirically
test the hypotheses derived in the previous section. We selected this setting for two main
reasons. First, local business tax revenues (i.e., the ‘Gewerbesteuer’) make up roughly
48% of municipal tax revenue (or 21% of total revenues; figures for 2004), and constitute
the main source of tax revenues for local governments in Baden-Württemberg (e.g., Geys
et al., 2010; Kalb et al., 2010). Moreover, previous research found evidence of strong
competition between municipalities in this state (Büttner, 2001, 2003; Hauptmeier et al.,
2009). This not only indicates the relevance of business tax revenues and competition
for such revenues within our setting, but also allows us to relate our findings to existing
work. Second, there exists a quasi-presidential system in the municipalities of Baden-
Württemberg, with a strong mayor and a rather weak council. This is important since
it implies that the decision-makers we surveyed (i.e., the mayors, see below) have real
decision-making power regarding fiscal policies.7
Specifically, we employ the results of a survey conducted in May 2008 among the may-
ors of all 1108 municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. The survey obtained a response rate
of 64.3%, thus providing a sizeable sample (N=712). Both the sample size and response
rate are exceptionally high compared to the few previous economic studies of politicians’
opinions (e.g., Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997, 2000; Hendrick et al., 2007; Heinemann and
Janeba, forthcoming). Also, and importantly, this sample is representative of the entire
population in terms of the geographical distribution of the municipalities (see table 3 in
the appendix). There are some quantitatively minor, but statistically significant, differ-
ences with respect to population size, unemployment rate, fiscal capacity and political
make-up. Hence, we directly control for the influence of these variables in the analysis
below.
The central question of interest for our purposes is the following: “With which cities
and municipalities do you perceive yourself to be particularly in competition for busi-
7Mayors are elected directly by the citizens for eight year periods and lead the administration of
the municipality. Moreover, they preside over the local council and have full voting rights there. This
generates a unique combination of executive authority and agenda-setting power.
9
nesses?” Respondents were thereby asked to assess the strength of competitive pressures
on a discrete scale from -4 (not at all regarded as competitors) to +4 (very strongly
regarded as competitors) regarding three types of jurisdictions: (Q1) cities and munic-
ipalities in Baden-Württemberg, (Q2) cities and municipalities in other German states,
and (Q3) cities and municipalities in other countries.8
The distribution of responses is illustrated in figure 1. Clearly, and unsurprisingly,
most respondents regard internal competitors (i.e., those from the state of Baden-Würt-
temberg) as their most important competitors. Still, significant variation exists across
respondents, especially when they are asked about external competitors (i.e., those from
other states or countries). Moreover, and crucially, respondents often strongly vary their
responses across the three types of competitors mentioned. This not only indicates that
answers to the survey were taken seriously, but also that mayors indeed perceive and re-
port differences in the extent of competitive pressures across the three groups mentioned.
It is this variation we exploit in our analysis.
Figure 1: Survey results, perceived competitive pressures (N=712)
For each of the three questions, the percentages add up to 100%. Source: Own calculations
8The original wording in German is: “Mit welchen anderen Städten und Gemeinden sehen Sie sich
besonders im Wettbewerb um Unternehmensansiedlungen?” Note that we did not ask respondents about
specific municipalities, but requested an opinion concerning the three general municipality types outlined.
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3.2 Specification and Methodology
Our baseline specification takes the following form:
RPCi = a+ b1Borderi +Xib2 + ei
The left-hand-side variable Relative Perceived Competition (RPC ) is constructed as the
difference of the perceived intensity of competition between two types of competitors:
those inside and those outside the state. This effectively leads to two separate variables:
a) RPCstate, which is calculated as the perceived intensity of competition with mu-
nicipalities in other German states (Q2) minus the perceived intensity of competition
with municipalities in Baden-Württemberg (Q1),
b) RPCcountry, which measures the perceived intensity of competition with munic-
ipalities in other countries (Q3) minus the perceived intensity of competition with
municipalities in Baden-Württemberg (Q1).
A value of zero in either case denotes that a given respondent regards municipalities in
other German states (or other countries) as equally important competitors compared to
municipalities in their own state. A negative (positive) value denotes that municipalities
in the same (other) state or country are more important competitors.
The central explanatory variables relate to the geographical placement of munici-
palities. We introduce a number of different operationalisations to address our various
hypotheses (see section 2.2). First, to study the impact of direct neighbourhood to a
state border (see H2), we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities di-
rectly located on one of Baden-Württemberg’s borders to its three surrounding German
states (i.e., Bavaria, Hessen and Rhineland-Palatinate), and 0 otherwise. Such an indica-
tor variable is appropriate since there are no major institutional differences between these
three neighbouring states. Altogether, 54 municipalities in our sample (7.6%) are located
adjacent to a state border. Second, to study the impact of direct neighbourhood to a
country border (see H2), we introduce an indicator variable equal to 1 for municipalities
bordering France (18 municipalities) or Switzerland (likewise 18 municipalities), and 0
otherwise. Given the institutional and cultural differences between these neighbours, we
also differentiate between the effect of the Swiss and the French border (see H3). Third,
to estimate the spatial reach of borders’ effects (i.e., see H1), we replace the dummies
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for adjacent municipalities with distances to the closest municipality beyond a state or
country border (and its squared value to capture non-linearities).9
Finally, in the vector Xi, we introduce a number of socio-economic control variables,
which are summarised in table 4 in the appendix. They first of all comprise the municipal
unemployment rate and the population of working age. Then, we include two political
variables reflecting the share of seats in the local council held by left-wing parties and
independents (so-called “Freie Wählervereinigungen”, see Geys et al., 2010), respectively.
They capture the influence of the ideological position of a given jurisdiction, which is
included because political ideology has been show to significantly affect politicians’ per-
ception of business tax competition (Heinemann and Janeba, forthcoming). Thirdly, we
introduce dummies identifying those municipalities which are the main beneficiaries of
transfers in the local system of fiscal equalisation. Since these municipalities are ar-
guably partially protected from competition (i.e., the system compensates for losses in
municipalities’ tax bases; e.g., Büttner, 2006), their decision-makers might have different
perceptions of competitive pressures.10 Fourth, we insert a dummy indicating that survey
responses were given directly by the mayor (rather than delegated by him to a member
of his bureaucracy). Finally, municipal size and dummies for highly agglomerated cities
intend to capture that urban centres are generally more exposed to external competition,
as demonstrated by Janeba and Osterloh (2010).
Before we turn to our estimation results, it is important to mention three aspects
regarding our estimation methodology. First, we centre all control variables by subtracting
their means. Hence, all right-hand side variables – except the neighbourhood dummies
and the distance measures – are rescaled to have an average of 0. This transformation
facilitates the interpretation of our results, especially for the coefficient on the constant,
which cannot be clearly interpreted without this transformation. Second, given the non-
continuous nature of the independent variables, we initially estimated all models using
an ordered probit approach; however, as there is a relatively large number of values those
variables can take (i.e., 17 options ranging from -8 to 8), we also ran all estimations
using OLS. Both sets of results provide qualitatively very similar results. As the OLS
9Distances are thereby defined as the minimum land distance between the centres of the relevant
jurisdictions.
10We exploit a discontinuity in the local system of fiscal equalization, which categorises municipalities
according to their “fiscal capacity” and gives those with a low fiscal capacity the highest contribution
rate, i.e., compensates them most extensively for reductions in their tax base (see Büttner, 2006).
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results are easier to interpret, we present those in section 4 (the ordered probit results
are available upon request). Finally, as the effect of proximity to borders is likely to
be highly non-linear, we complement the OLS regressions, which include distance and
distance squared as discussed above, with natural spline regressions. This particularly
accounts for nonlinear effects and allows a much more detailed analysis of the proximity
effect (see Beatty et al., 2009, and Brülhart et al., 2010, for recent applications of this
estimator to the analysis of border effects).
4 Empirical results
4.1 State borders
Table 1 reports our results regarding the impact of subnational borders on mayors’ per-
ceptions of inter-jurisdictional competitive pressures. In column (1), we focus on the
impact of direct neighbourhood to a state border. The coefficient estimate for the con-
stant equals -3.155 and is statistically significant beyond the 1% level. This indicates
that mayors on average regard municipalities in their own state as much closer competi-
tors than those beyond the state borders (remember that a value of 0 would set both
competitors at the same level), which suggests a relatively important ‘closing-off’ po-
tential of state borders. Yet, in line with our hypothesis H2, this effect is strongly and
statistically significantly counteracted by direct neighbourhood to state borders (see the
top row of table 1). This indicates that a decision-maker from a border-municipality
perceives, ceteris paribus, much higher competitive pressure from other German states
than decision-makers from municipalities in the interior of the state. Nevertheless, even a
border-municipality perceives significantly higher competition intensity from municipali-
ties within their own state (-3.155+1.953=-1.202; p=0.002). However, this disaggregation
of the constant demonstrates that the apparent strength of the ‘closing-off’ effect of state
borders is predominantly driven by the distance of most municipalities to state borders
(i.e., the adverse proximity effect, see below), and not by the border effect itself.
Replacing the dummies for adjacent municipalities with the distance to the closest
municipality beyond a state border (and its squared value) in column (2), two things
are worth emphasising. First, the value of the constant term, which now represents the
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Table 1: Effect of subnational borders, OLS regressions
Relative Perceived Competition with municipalities
in other states (RPCstate)
(1) (2)
Neighbour state border 1.953***
(0.335)
State Border Distance -0.0490***
(0.00899)
State Border Distance2 0.000302***
(6.88e-05)
Unemployment ratet−1 -2.706 0.822
(17.98) (17.97)
Population Working-aget−1 -5.423 -7.706*
(4.397) (4.407)
Left-wingt 0.870 0.286
(0.964) (0.964)
Free Voterst -0.147 -0.0518
(0.470) (0.474)
Fiscal capacityt: low -0.766** -0.877***
(0.329) (0.330)
Fiscal capacityt: medium -0.527* -0.465
(0.317) (0.317)
Mayor 0.120 0.141
(0.187) (0.187)
Log(Population)t−1 -0.172 -0.073
(0.160) (0.165)
Regional centre 1.567** 1.392*
(0.748) (0.758)
Secondary centre 0.710* 0.651*
(0.365) (0.368)
Constant -3.155*** -1.684***
(0.212) (0.310)
Observations 712 712
R-squared 0.067 0.071
Standard errors in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
perceptions of mayors on the state border (or, technically, for municipalities where the
distance to this border is 0km), is still significantly negative. This re-confirms that,
although mayors of municipalities on the border still regard municipalities in their own
state as closer competitors than those beyond the state borders, the strength of their
perception is much weaker than the estimated average value (which is -3.155, see column
(1)). Second, we find a significant non-linear effect of proximity to borders.
In order to evaluate the implied persistence of the border’s effects in more detail,
it is instructive to switch to the results from the natural spline regressions, which are
visualised in figure 2. These results first of all confirm that the null hypothesis of “no
border effect”, i.e., municipalities regard internal and external competitors as equally im-
portant, can be rejected even for municipalities with a very low distance to other states
(i.e., the 95%-confidence interval around the point estimate never encompass 0). Second,
the lower bound of the confidence interval around the estimated effect intersects with
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the mean value of the dependent variable, which is represented by the horizontal line in
figure 2, at a distance of 20.3 kilometres. This indicates a significant and strong (but
declining) proximity effect in the perceptions of the mayors of municipalities up to 20.3
kilometres from the state border (in line with H1). Beyond this point, the estimated
value is no longer statistically significantly different from the average of all jurisdictions.
Consequently, our results indicate that politicians’ perceptions become ‘immune’ to extra-
regional competitive forces at distances beyond 20km from the border. Altogether, 233
out of the 1108 municipalities of the state are located within this critical distance (21.0%).
Figure 2: Subnational borders, natural spline regressions
Note: Smooth line is obtained by cubic spline with five knots. 95% confidence interval indicated by shaded area. Straight
line represents mean value of RPCstate = -3.17.
4.2 Effect of international borders
Turning to the analysis of international borders, our results are summarised in table 2.
In column (1), we do not differentiate between the French and Swiss border and focus on
direct adjacency to one of these countries. The estimated coefficient of the constant is
again negative and even larger than in the previous section. Although we once again find
that this effect is counteracted by direct neighbourhood to the border (see the top row
of table 2), this reductive effect is both substantively and statistically (p<0.10) weaker
than in the sub-national case. Both these results imply that international borders are
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indeed perceived by local mayors as ‘stronger’ borders than regional ones (supportive
of H2). Interestingly, this finding helps illuminate recent failures to find cross-border
interactions by means of traditional spatial econometrics techniques in the tax setting of
French and German municipalities (Cassette et al., 2010). Indeed, our findings suggest
that politicians generally perceive country borders to be relatively strong, and therefore
focus predominantly on the decisions of neighbours on their own side of the border. The
only exceptions are those in charge of a municipality in very close proximity to this border,
as we will see below.
In order to evaluate H3, we differentiate in column (2) between the effect of the Swiss
and the French border. The results indicate that the effect of the Swiss border is about
twice the size of that of the French one. It also is significantly different from zero at
the 10% significance level, whereas the effect of adjacency to France remains statistically
insignificant. Given the different nature of both borders, one tentative explanation is that
politicians perceive the cultural dimension of these respective borders (i.e., language) to
be more important than the institutional dimension (EU versus non-EU).11 Hence, our
results appear supportive of the idea that the effect of international borders varies with
the cultural and institutional dimensions of such borders (as proposed in H3). Still, an
alternative explanation may lie in Switzerland’s aggressive corporate tax policy. The
average effective tax rates of the adjacent cantons’ capitals ranged from 13.9 to 20.9% in
2009, compared to 34.2% in the French city of Strasbourg and between 21.9 and 26.8%
in the state of Baden-Württemberg (see BAK Basel 2009).
We obtain the results in columns (3) and (4) by replacing the border dummies with
the minimum distance to the closest foreign municipality. As before, the value of the
constant term rises above the average value, indicating that mayors’ perception of munic-
ipalities in their own state as closer competitors than those beyond the country’s borders
is weaker in municipalities on the border than in municipalities away from the border.12
The difference, however, is much weaker than in the regional-border case, reinforcing our
earlier finding that local mayors perceive international borders as ‘stronger’ borders than
11A potential problem here is that many direct neighbours to France have a sizeable distance to the next
French city because the river Rhine runs between them. Restricting the sample to those municipalities
with a direct connection to France via a bridge or ferry (13 observations), however, does not affect our
results in terms of both coefficient estimate and statistical significance (available upon request).
12Note that the intercept in column (4) obviously becomes meaningless since no municipality can at
once be at 0km distance from France, Switzerland and Austria. Hence, this interpretation is only valid
for column (3).
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Table 2: International borders, OLS regressions
Relative Perceived Competition with municipalities
in other countries (RPCcountry)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbour International Border 0.942*
(0.484)
Neighbour Int. Border: FRA 0.652
(0.677)
Neighbour Int. Border: SUI 1.226*
(0.672)
Int. Border Distance -0.0215**
(0.0106)
Int. Border Distance2 0.000132*
(7.48e-05)
Int. Border Distance: FRA -0.0391*
(0.0227)
Int. Border Distance2: FRA 0.000159**
(7.24e-05)
Int. Border Distance: SUI -0.0175*
(0.0106)
Int. Border Distance2: SUI 0.000149
(0.000115)
Int. Border Distance: AUT -7.55e-05
(0.0140)
Int. Border Distance2: AUT -7.23e-05
(7.71e-05)
Unemployment ratet−1 0.882 1.097 7.020 13.52
(21.40) (21.41) (21.76) (22.67)
Population Working-aget−1 -4.494 -4.188 -3.894 -3.972
(5.209) (5.235) (5.211) (5.322)
Left-wingt -0.108 -0.129 0.0623 0.272
(1.138) (1.139) (1.143) (1.164)
Free Voterst -0.971* -0.981* -0.775 -0.714
(0.559) (0.559) (0.575) (0.587)
Fiscal capacityt: low -1.049*** -1.048*** -1.069*** -1.084***
(0.390) (0.391) (0.391) (0.396)
Fiscal capacityt: medium -0.609 -0.612 -0.606 -0.605
(0.376) (0.377) (0.376) (0.376)
Mayor 0.193 0.187 0.193 0.189
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Log(Population)t−1 -0.207 -0.211 -0.164 -0.156
(0.190) (0.190) (0.192) (0.198)
Regional centre 1.770** 1.753** 1.553* 1.354
(0.887) (0.887) (0.894) (0.911)
Secondary centre 0.814* 0.820* 0.757* 0.681
(0.431) (0.431) (0.433) (0.443)
Constant -3.757*** -3.748*** -3.041*** -0.464
(0.251) (0.252) (0.403) (2.606)
Observations 712 712 712 712
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.040
Standard errors in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
regional ones. As before, we also find a significant non-linear effect of proximity to the
border. This finding is replicated when separating France, Switzerland and Austria, al-
though the results for Austria remain statistically insignificant.13 The associated natural
13Although Baden-Württemberg does not share a border with Austria, we pick it up here as it is the
nearest country for a small number of municipalities.
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spline regressions, depicted in figure 3, differ from those for the state borders in two central
respects. First, we observe that the border effect is much stronger in the case of country
borders (as could also be gathered from a comparison of tables 1 and 2). Second, the
proximity effect is much weaker than in the regional-border case and ceases after a much
shorter distance. Already at a distance of 12.5 km, the lower bound of the confidence
interval intersects the abscissa indicating the mean value. In other words, for munici-
palities more than 12.5 kilometres away from the neighbouring country, ‘proximity’ to
the border no longer affects decision-makers’ perceptions of the intensity of international
competition.14 Even so, 105 municipalities (9.5% of all municipalities in the state) are
located within this critical distance. The geographical location of municipalities within
the critical distance to a state or country border is visualised in figure 4.
Figure 3: International borders, natural spline regression
Note: Smooth line is obtained by cubic spline with five knots. 95% confidence interval indicated by shaded area. Straight
line represents mean value of RPCcountry = -3.88.
14This might in part explain the non-significant effects for Austria discussed above. Indeed, since there
are only few municipalities with a rather low distance to Austria in the sample, the fact that the effect
of proximity to other countries ceases quickly implies we cannot expect a strong effect for Austria.
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Figure 4: Location of municipalities within critical distances
Light-coloured : distance to closest municipality in other German state < 20.3km; Intermediate-coloured : distance to closest
municipality in other country < 12.5km; Dark-coloured : distance to closest municipality in other German state < 20.3km
and distance to closest municipality in other country < 12.5km
Before we conclude, we should say a few words about the results of our control vari-
ables, which perform fairly consistently across tables 1 and 2. Most significantly, we find
that the local system of fiscal equalisation indeed appears to affect the competition per-
ceptions of decision-makers in municipalities with low (and, to a lesser extent, medium)
fiscal capacity. In line with the idea that this system compensates such municipalities for
losses in their tax bases relative to other municipalities in the state, their mayors perceive
that competition is rather a local issue. We also confirm that decision-makers of highly
agglomerated cities, as they are generally more exposed to external competition, perceive
competitive pressures to come relatively more from extra-regional municipalities (see also
Janeba and Osterloh, 2010). Neither the local unemployment rate nor the population
of working age plays a significant role in politicians’ perceptions. Furthermore, political
variables play no consistent role in our estimations either.
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5 Concluding discussion
A common characteristic of existing work investigating local-level spatial policy interac-
tions is that the specification of the neighbourhood matrix, which defines who is expected
to compete with whom, occurs solely with respect to other jurisdictions within the region
under study and, consequently, by assumption ignores the potential influence of juris-
dictions in neighbouring regions. Analysing German local politicians’ perceptions about
their municipality’s main competitors in the struggle for business investments (i.e., other
jurisdictions a) in their own region, b) in other regions in the same country, or c) in other
countries), we evaluated the credibility of this assumption. Our results provide at best
a partial confirmation. Specifically, we find that local decision-makers on average indeed
regard municipalities in their own state as much closer competitors than those beyond the
state borders. Crucially, however, we show, that location close to a border significantly
undermines the perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdic-
tions within their own state. Moreover, this effect is stronger for, and is felt at further
distances from, subnational than inter-national borders. Overall, nearest municipalities
appear keenly aware of each other as competitors for mobile capital. This effect persists
independent of the state or country where they are located.
In our view, these results have two important practical implications. First, they
provide a parsimonious explanation for the presence of cross-regional local-level strategic
interactions (e.g., Brügger and Parchet, 2010) and the difficulties to identify equivalent
cross-country interactions (Cassette et al., 2010). Indeed, our findings suggest that it is
politicians’ perceptions about the relative constraints imposed by these different types
of borders that defines the (absence of) reaction to extra-regional jurisdictions’ actions.
Moreover, our empirical approach allows us to quantify the spatial extent of such border-
related effects. In particular, whereas the proximity to international borders ceases to
affect local decision-makers’ opinions at a distance of about 12.5km, the proximity to
subnational borders plays a role up to about 20km. Interestingly, the latter finding is in
close accordance with recent findings by Brügger and Parchet (2010) using a sample of
Swiss municipalities separated by a cultural border. They show that jurisdictions’ tax
choices are constrained by tax competition at a distance of up to 20 kilometres. Our
results suggest that these conform findings may well result from the fact that decision-
makers do not consider municipalities beyond this critical distance as their rivals in the
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competition for mobile capital. This also corroborates with the finding by van Dijk and
Pellenbarg (2000) that firm migration is mostly short distance; short distance moves allow
firms to keep most of their workforce since it is within a reasonable commuting distance.
Moreover, within the identified critical distance firms can still maintain relations with
local suppliers or selling markets as well as local networks.
Second, our results imply that if one refrains from taking these inter-border links into
account, one runs the risk of attributing the fiscal reactions of the analysed jurisdictions
to an inappropriately constrained reference group of competing jurisdictions; this could
result in an overestimation of the spatial interaction coefficient. The results of our natural
spline regressions suggest that the likelihood of obtaining such biased estimates is sub-
stantial; indeed, no less than 21% of all municipalities in our sample are located within
the critical distance to a state border, and 9.5% within the critical distance to another
country. Inappropriate coding of such a large share of observations is unacceptable. Con-
sequently, future studies of local-level policy interactions in regional science and urban
and public economics should either move beyond the customary single-region design (as,
e.g., Brügger and Parchet, 2010; Cassette et al., 2010; Gérard et al., 2010) or refine the
commonly used contiguity- or distance-based neighbourhood matrices. Since one often
lacks comparable data when trying to include jurisdictions from a different administrative
region or country, the second option appears most feasible. Specifically, given the differ-
ences in the perceptions of their local decision-makers, jurisdictions near a border should
be treated differently (i.e., receive a different weight in the spatial weights matrix reflect-
ing this difference in perceptions) from ‘inland’ jurisdictions to avoid biased inferences.
Alternatively, one could account for any potential distinctiveness of border-jurisdictions
by splitting up the weights matrix into multiple independent matrices for border- and
non-border jurisdictions (see also footnote 3).15 At the very least, robustness analyses
should be presented indicating whether or not the inclusion/exclusion and/or different
treatment of border-jurisdictions affects the inferences from the analysis.
15Based on our finding that different types of borders can have different effects (e.g., regional versus
national borders, France versus Switzerland), such differential treatment should – ideally – take the
specific context of the jurisdiction into account and depend on the extent to which two jurisdictions
separated by a border are close or distant substitutes.
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6 Appendix
Table 3: Means of respondents and non-respondents
Variable Mean: Respondents Mean: Non-respondents t-test for equal mean
(p-value)
Neighbour State Border 0.076 0.066 0.576
State Border Distance 50.871 52.938 0.378
Neighbour International Border 0.051 0.072 0.165
Neighbour Int. Border: FRA 0.025 0.035 0.405
Neighbour Int. Border: SUI 0.025 0.041 0.176
Int. Border Distance 61.268 61.074 0.940
Int. Border Distance: FRA 80.708 86.778 0.044
Int. Border Distance: SUI 101.664 92.393 0.013
Int. Border Distance: AUT 138.882 129.812 0.006
Log(Population) 8.710 8.357 0.000
Unemployment rate 0.019 0.018 0.010
Share working-age 0.655 0.657 0.284
Left wings 0.185 0.158 0.008
Free voters 0.465 0.534 0.001
Fiscal Capacity: low 0.389 0.465 0.022
Fiscal Capacity: medium 0.518 0.475 0.198
Regional centre 0.020 0.006 0.109
Secondary centre 0.103 0.069 0.088
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Table 4: Variable definitions
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Source
Log(Population) Logarithm of total population 8.710 0.978 5.814 13.296 Statistical Of-
fice of Baden-
Württemberg
(SOBW)
Unemployment
rate
Share of registered unemployed in
total population
0.019 0.006 0.006 0.040 SOBW
Share Workage Share of population aged between
15 and 65 years
0.655 0.021 0.571 0.742 SOBW
Left wing Seat share of left-wing parties in
local council
0.185 0.150 0 0.571 SOBW
Free voters Seat share of free voter unions
(“Freie Wählervereinigungen”) in
local council
0.465 0.297 0 1 SOBW
Fiscal Capac-
ity: low
Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity is
smaller than 0.6; highest trans-
fers from the local system of fiscal
equalisation
0.389 0.488 0 1 SOBW
Fiscal Capac-
ity: medium
Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity is be-
tween 0.6 and 1.0; moderate trans-
fers from the local system of fiscal
equalisation
0.518 0.500 0 1 SOBW
Regional centre Dummy = 1 if classified as regional
centre (‘Oberzentrum’), highest
category of centrality in German
spatial planning policy
0.020 0.139 0 1 Wirtschaftsminis-
terium Baden-
Württemberg
Secondary cen-
tre
Dummy = 1 if classified as sec-
ondary centre (‘Mittelzentrum’),
second highest category of central-
ity in German spatial planning pol-
icy
0.103 0.304 0 1 Wirtschaftsminis-
terium Baden-
Württemberg
Mayor Dummy = 1 if response directly
from mayor
0.475 0.500 0 1 Own survey
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